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This	 paper	 critiques	 popular	 academic	 understandings	 of	 development	 towards	 a	 post-capitalist,	
post-work	society	based	around	the	automation	of	production	and	the	provision	of	a	basic	income	to	
those	displaced	by	its	effects.	By	focusing	on	work	and	its	escape	as	the	central	issue	at	stake	in	the	
transition	 to	 a	 postcapitalist	 society,	 these	 accounts	 miss	 how,	 at	 one	 end,	 capitalist	 work	 is	
preconditioned	 by	 a	 historically-specific	 set	 of	 antagonistic	 social	 relations	 of	 constrained	 social	
reproduction,	and,	at	the	other,	by	the	specific	social	 forms	assumed	by	the	results	of	that	work	 in	
commodity	exchange	and	 the	 constituted	 form	of	 the	nation-state.	Retaining	money,	 commodities	
and	 the	 rule	 of	 value	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 a	 national	 state	postcapitalist	 and	 post-work	 vistas	
represent	abstract	‘bad	utopias’	that	break	insufficiently	with	the	present,	and	in	some	ways	make	it	
worse,	 replacing	 a	 wage	 over	 which	 workers	 can	 lawfully	 struggle	 with	 a	 state-administered	
monetary	 payment	 that	 creates	 a	 direct	 relationship	 of	 power	 between	 citizen	 and	 state.	 This	 is	
highlighted	in	 the	 potential	 adoption	 of	 basic	 income	 as	 part	 of	 authoritarian	 nationalist	 policy	
platforms	including	that	of	Nerendra	Modi	in	India.	Suggesting	that	struggles	over	the	contradictory	
forms	assumed	by	social	 reproduction	 in	capitalist	 society	are	 themselves	 labour	 struggles	and	not	
external	to	them,	we	pose	a	‘concrete	utopian’	alternative	that	creates	the	capacity	to	reshape	the	
relationship	 between	 individuals,	 society	 and	 the	 rule	 of	 money,	 value	 and	 the	 state	 rather	 than	
reinforce	 it.	 To	 illustrate	 this	 we	 examine	 the	 Unemployed	 Workers	 Organisations	 instituted	 in	
Argentina.	This	poses	one	potential	means	of	devolving	monetary	and	non-monetary	resources	and	
power	rather	than	centralising	them	in	the	hands	of	an	all-powerful	‘postcapitalist’	state	that	would	
















the	present	and	 into	 the	 future.	But	 this,	we	argue,	will	not	come	through	 the	suite	of	options	 for	
escaping	work	alone-	principally,	automation	and	the	basic	 income.	This	 is	because	work	as	such	 is	
not	 the	 central	 social	 relationship	 that	defines	 capitalism,	and	 is	 therefore	not	 the	key	 thing	 to	do	






social	 relations	 of	 separation	 from	 and	 dispossession	 of	 the	 means	 of	 production	 and	 the	
reproduction	of	labour-power,	and,	at	the	other	end,	in	the	form	its	results	assume	as	value-bearing	
commodities	exchanged	in	the	market	by	means	of	money.	We	thus	combine	two	radically	revisionist	
schools	 of	 contemporary	Marxism.	 First	 is	 the	 social	 reproduction	 approach.	 Zechner	 and	 Hansen	
(2015)	 define	 social	 reproduction	 as	 ‘a	 broad	 term	 for	 the	 domain	 where	 lives	 are	 sustained	 and	
reproduced.’	 This	suggests	 that	 capitalism	 is	 characterised	 as	much	 by	what	 supports	 a	 society	 of	
work	than	work	itself.		
	
We	 complement	 this	 social	 reproduction	 understanding	 of	 the	 social	 relations	 that	 characterize	
capitalist	 society	 with	 Marxian	 value-form	 theory	 in	 order	 to	 comprehend	 the	 'social	 forms'	 that	
render	 capitalism	 an	 historically	 specific	 social	 formation	 (see	 Heinrich	 2012,	 Pitts	 2017).	This	







'paid	 work'	 and	 the	 supplement	 of	 a	 UBI.	 Rather	 what	 we	 understand	 by	 'work'	 and	 its	
commodification	and	monetarisation	needs	to	be	re-evaluated.	
	
We	 suggest	 that	 the	 postcapitalist	 prospectus	 fails	 on	 three	 fronts.	 The	 first	 is	 that	 the	 post-work	
literature	is	productivist	insofar	as	it	sees	‘work’	as	the	central	relation	of	capitalist	society	and	not	as	











or	post-capitalist	 society	does	class	 struggles	 feature,	when	 it	 is	only	by	means	of	 this	 that	a	post-
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capitalist	 society	 can	 be	 accessed	 at	 all.	 We	 suggest	 the	 politics	 of	 social	 reproduction	 as	 an	
alternative	 prospectus	 for	 radical	 change	within	 and	 beyond	 capitalist	 society	 that	 overcomes	 the	
one-sided	 focus	on	 the	escape	 from	work	as	 the	harbinger	of	postcapitalism	and	engages	with	 the	
present	struggles	for	alternative	forms	of	social	reproduction.	We	take	one	specific	example	of	this-	
the	Unemployed	Workers	Organisations	established	in	post-crisis	Argentina-	as	a	model	for	how	the	
relationship	 with	 work,	 subsistence	 and	 money	 can	 be	 reconstituted	 in	 such	 a	 way	 as	 to	 work	
through	 the	 contradictions	 of	 labour,	money,	 state	 and	 social	 reproduction	without	wishing	 them	
away.	
	
We	 conclude	 by	 suggesting	 that	 the	 potential	 solution	 to	 the	 three	 impasses	 identified	 in	 the	
literature	on	post-work	and	post-capitalist	society	is	to	work	within	contradictions	and	expand	them.	




radical	 responses	 to	 the	 crisis	 of	 work	 and	 the	 wage.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 technology	 and	
automation	cannot	be	reified	as	neutral	forces	the	unfolding	of	which	will	deliver	us	a	workless	world	
supported	by	the	intervention	of	the	state	as	the	new	wage	payer.	Rather,	even	on	the	terms	of	the	
postcapitalist	 prospectus	 itself,	 class	 struggles	 would	 be	 necessary	 to	 accomplish	 the	 kind	 of	
economy-wide	automation	on	which	their	vistas	of	the	future	hinge.	But	in	that	literature,	post-work	
society	 is	 seen	 as	 the	 accomplishment	 of	 a	 kind	 of	 ‘end	 of	 history’	 that	 closes	 contradictions	 and	









There	 is	 little	 new	 in	 the	post-work	prospectus	 (PWP).	 Current	debates	mirror	 those	 that	 followed	
the	 last	 deep	 capitalist	 crisis	 in	 the	 1970s.	 The	 origins	 of	 the	 PWP	 rest	 in	a	 few	 formerly	 obscure	
pages	 from	Marx’s	Grundrisse	–	 the	 'Fragment	 on	Machines'	(1973,	 pp.	 704-706;	 see	 Pitts	 2017a).	
Early	 PWP	 advocates	 Antonio	 Negri	 (1991)	 and	 André	 Gorz	 (1989)	 were	 central	 in	 its	
dissemination.	Today,	 its	 scenario	 of	 postcapitalist	 worklessness	 finds	itself	popularised	 via	 new	






within	 the	 present	for	 the	 revitalization	 of	 progressive	 left	 politics.	 The	 empirical	 and	 theoretical	
contributions	 to	 the	PWP	are	 rich	and	varied,	but	 it	 is	possible	 to	 isolate	 several	 shared	emphases	
and	 central	 propositions.	 First,	 the	 development	 of	 information	 technology	 is	 ‘accelerating’.	 Allied	
with	crisis	tendencies	in	the	current	phase	of	capital	accumulation,	this	terminates	in	a	post-capitalist	
future.	 Second,	dynamics	 of	 automation	 and	new	 cooperative	 commons	potentiate	 a	post-work	
society	 of	 abundance	 and	 leisure.	 Third,	progressive	 left	 politics	must	 surpass	limited,	 reactive	 and	







(see	Spencer	2016;	Dyer-Witheford	2015).	 Information	 technology	appears	 the	harbinger	of	 a	new	
social	 structure.	 Informationalized,	 dematerialized	 new	 technologies	 are	 cast	 as	autonomous	
processes	 with	 sociological	 effects	(Castells,	 1996;	 Lash	 &	 Urry,	 1994;	 Giddens,	 2002).	 As	 Doogan	
suggests	 (2009:	 55)	 these	 technological	 developments	 cannot	 be	 understood	without	 reference	 to	
broader	material	dynamics.	These	centre	on	the	neoliberal	restructuring	of	 labour	markets	and	the	









The	 post-work	 prospectus	 professes	 anti-productivism.	 As	 abovementioned,	 state-led	 automation	
will	 simultaneously	 increase	 productivity	 and	 facilitate	 the	 freeing	 of	 labour	 from	 production,	 and	
create	 the	 fiscal	 resources	 to	 support	 the	 transition	 via	 UBI.	 Yet,	 despite	 this	 professed	 anti-
productivism,	 the	 assault	 on	 the	 society	 of	 work	 actually	 suffers	 from	 its	 reverse,	 a	 denied	
productivism	 that,	 like	 traditional	Marxists	 through	 time,	 sees	work	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 everything.	 A	
critical	Marxism	(see	Pitts	2017b),	on	the	other	hand,	recognizes	that,	where	productive	activity	has	





Where	 Marx	 wrote	 of	 the	 ‘misfortune’	 of	 being	 a	 ‘productive	 worker’	 (1976,	 p.	 644),	 the	
contemporary	critical	imaginary	of	a	world	without	work	focuses	on	only	one	part	of	this	formulation,	





















‘productivist	mandates’,	 these	 generate	 various	 resonances	 between	 the	 auspiciously	 radical	 post-
work	perspective	and	a	number	of	other	stabilising	elements	within	the	present	system,	reactionary	
ideas	 at	 its	 edge,	 or	 revolutionary	 short-circuits	 of	 the	 past:	 most	 notably	 Silicon	 Valley’s	 self-
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optimising	 productivity	 fetish	 and	 the	 technological	 singularity	 sought	 by	wealthy	 scions	 like	 Peter	
Thiel,	 but	 also,	 at	 a	 more	 subterranean	 level,	 fascist	 coalitions	 of	 the	 productive	 seeking	 the	
liquidation	of	the	unproductive.	
	
This	 paper	 explores	 how	 the	 critique	 of	 work	 constructs	 new	 standards	 of	 productiveness	 in	
conformity	with	 those	 to	which	we	 are	 subject	 already.	 The	 post-work	 standard-bearers	 of	 a	 new	
Marxism	 set	 up	 their	 view	 of	 an	 imminent	 post-work	 world	 based	 on	 a	 division	 between	 the	
productive	 and	 unproductive	 that	 suggests	 anything	 but	 the	 radical	 alternative	 to	 capitalism	 they	
seem	to	think	it	does.	
	
Despite	 different	 politics,	 our	 present-day	 post-work	 dreamers	 desire	 much	 the	 same	 flat-white	





path	 to	peak	performance	 (Gregg	2015a,	2015b,	2016).	Superficially,	 the	Silicon	Valley	paragons	of	
self-help	productivity	mantras	could	not	be	more	different	than	the	anti-productivist	prophets	of	an	




a	more	 productive	 use	 of	 our	 time	 than	 others.	 In	 both,	 this	 results	 in	 a	 rejection	 of	work	 that	 is	
messy	 and	 menial.	 When	 the	 latter	 is	 not	 ignored	 completely,	 both	 Silicon	 Valley	 productivity	
fetishists	 and	 post-work	 dreamers	 assume	 its	 delegation	 to	 others,	 automation	 by	 robots	 or	
liquidation	 altogether.	 And	 the	 consequences	 could	 be	 far	 removed	 from	 the	 capitalist	 and	
postcapitalist	utopias	on	offer.	
	
Both	 mistakenly	 see	 labour	 and	 direct	 productive	 effort	 as	 the	 characteristic,	 crucial	 element	 of	
capitalism.	 The	 difference	 is	 that	 one	 does	 so	 positively,	 and	 the	 other	 negatively.	 The	 post-work	
dreamers	see	the	escape	from	work	as	the	escape	from	capitalism.	Silicon	Valley	self-help	gurus	see	
hard	work	as	the	secret	of	capitalism.	But	both	ignore	the	extent	to	which	capitalism	is	defined	not	in	
the	 specific	 productive	 activity	 that	 takes	place	within	 it,	 but,	 at	 one	end,	 the	 social	 relations	 that	
make	a	society	in	which	there	is	no	way	to	live	except	for	the	selling	of	labour	power	possible	in	the	






















looking	 after	 one	 another,	 and	 sharing	 the	 distribution	 of	 cleaning,	 cooking,	 and	 caring	 more	
equitably.	 Indeed,	 the	 tedious	 nature	 of	 many	 aspects	 of	 this	 work	 is	 cast	 by	 the	 postcapitalist	
utopians	 as	 something	 to	 be	 reduced	 to	 a	 minimum	 and	 outsourced	 to	 our	 new	 robot	 slaves.	
Meanwhile,	 the	 self-optimising	 professionals	 of	 Silicon	 Valley	 also	 see	 such	 socially	 reproductive	
activities	as	something	to	be	dispatched	with	as	swiftly	and	efficiently	as	possible,	as	a	potential	block	
to	 the	work	where	all	 the	magic	happens-	productive	 labour,	 the	only	other	 things	we	need	spend	
time	 on	 being	 mindfulness	 and	 meditation.	 What	 this	 usually	 implies	 is	 the	 presence	 of	 others-	
commodified	or	uncommodified	providers	of	socially	reproductive	labour-	to	step	in	and	take	up	the	
slack	for	the	productive	lifestyles	of	those	among	the	silicon	saved.	For	instance,	at	Google,	unlimited	
free	 lunch	 is	 dished	 up	 by	 hands	 the	 owners	 of	 which	 remain	 unseen,	 the	 rest	 of	 their	 bodies	
obscured	by	the	hot	cafeteria	metal.	Both	post-work	paragons	and	productivity	ninjas	similarly	elide	
the	classed,	gendered	and	racialized	dimensions	of	 the	distribution	of	 the	work	 that	supports	 their	
chosen	scenarios.	 In	both	cases,	the	question	remains:	who	does	the	work	that	makes	possible	the	
more	 productive	 use	 of	 our	 own	 time?	 With	 no	 solution	 offered	 in	 the	 post-work	 scenarios	 to	
definitively	restructure	the	antagonistic	social	relations	of	production	that	support	this	unequal	share	





wageless	 work)	 sleep,	 both	 the	 post-work	 and	 productivity-fetishist	 perspectives	 on	 a	 more	
productive	 future	 tell	a	 story	almost	always	solely	about	 the	person	 telling	 it.	As	Angela	McRobbie	
notes,	 both	 mainstream	 and	 radical	 postoperaist	 accounts	 of	 the	 creative	 economy	 tend	 to	 talk	
about	a	specific	kind	of	male	experience	in	seeking	the	liberation	from	useless	labour	(2016,	pp.	94-5,	
100,	157).	This	functions	a	little	like	the	attraction	of	studying	the	Gramscian	theory	of	hegemony	for	
aspirant	 cadres	 of	 governments	 and	 NGOs,	 which	 Kees	 van	 der	 Pijl	 ascribes	 to	 its	 empowering	
narrative	of	a	revolutionary	‘war	of	position’	fought	by	humble	bourgeois	clerks	(van	der	Pijl	2005).	
Indeed,	Gramsci	hangs	heavy	over	schemes	for	how	to	achieve	a	post-work	society-	most	notably	in	
Srnicek	 and	 Williams’s	 interesting	 suggestion	 of	 a	 Mont	 Pelerin	 Society	 of	 the	 left	 (Srnicek	 and	
Williams	 2015).	 This	 exposes	 the	 weakness	 of	 contemporary	 appropriations	 of	 Gramsci	 by	 non-




a	 means	 to	 pave	 their	 way	 through	 the	 world.	 There	 is	 little	 wonder	 the	 uptake	 for	 post-work	
thinking	has	been	so	strong	among	journalists	and	academics,	as	well	as	creatives	and	artists,	since	







they	 love,	 whereas	 to	 optimise	 one’s	 time	 to	 be	 better	 at	 work	 is	 for	 most	 a	 means	 of	 self-
exploitation	 in	 a	 job	 they	 hate,	 but	 for	 whom	 a	 lack	 of	 other	 skills	 or	 options	 makes	 it	 the	 only	
possible	 link	 to	 the	means	of	 living.	 In	 this	 it	only	 retreads	what	 traditional	Marxism	did	 for	 years,	
celebrating	the	productive	power	of	a	vanguard	class	of	workers	as	the	means	by	which	a	new	world	
is	unlocked.	The	 fetishization	of	productiveness	 in	 the	 self-help	books	 finds	 its	 reflective	 flipside	 in	






Far	 from	negating	 the	 role	of	work	 in	capitalist	 society	altogether,	what	 this	does	 is	 reproduce	 the	
capitalist	 division	 between	 productive	 and	 unproductive	 labour	 along	 different	 lines.	 These	 lines	
become	dangerous	points	of	 separation	when	 tied	 to	 revolutionary	programmes	 for	a	new	kind	of	
society	 forged	 in	 a	 context	 of	 human	 and	 economic	 crisis	 their	 proponents	 seek	 to	 posit	 the	
resolution	 of.	 Dreams	 of	 a	 basic	 income-funded	 future	 rhetorically	 idealise	 activities	 like	
programming	 or	 uploading	 an	 Airbnb	 listing	 only	 by	 uncritically	 seeing	 them	 as	 liberated	 in	 the	
present,	 rather	 than	 subject	 to	 the	 same	 ‘bullshit’	 as	 any	 other	 job.	 Indeed,	 like	 right	 and	 left	
totalitarianisms	through	time,	it	encourages	the	pursuit	of	idealised	activities	characterised	as	more	
productive	 than	others-	at	 the	 risk	of	 liquidating	 those	activities	considered	unproductive	and	with	
them	their	actors.	Aiming	at	 the	mediation	of	class	antagonisms	at	a	higher	 level	 rather	 than	 their	
abolition,	it	celebrates	the	productive	workers	engaged	in	these	activities	in	much	the	same	way	that	
totalitarianisms	 of	 the	 right	 and	 left	 have	 modelled	 their	 visions	 of	 society	 around	 an	 idealised	
productive	worker	at	once	sourced	from	capitalism	but	erected	into	an	absurd	caricature.	And,	with	
devastating	effect,	this	reduces	what	is	‘unproductive’	to	ruin-	whether	along	racial	or	class	lines.	This	
echoes	 in	 the	 present-day	 disdain	 for	 finance	 industries	 that	 issues	 from	personalising	 critiques	 of	
capitalism	 on	 both	 the	 right	 and	 left.	 Unproductive	 work	 becomes	 synonymous	 with	 unearned	
wealth.	The	new	populisms	pose	themselves	as	alliances	of	the	productive.	Draining	the	swamp,	they	
propose	 to	 prosecute,	 persecute	 and	 eventually	 purge	 the	 unproductive.	 As	 leftist	 critics	 of	
capitalism	line	up	behind	the	prospectus	of	a	powerful	state	providing	a	basic	 income	to	a	national	
citizenry	 in	 search	 of	 the	 optimum	 use	 of	 time	 against	 the	 unproductive,	 the	 inefficient	 and	 the	
‘bullshit’,	what	could	possibly	go	wrong?		
	















‘work’.	This	 takes	work	as	 the	basis	of	capitalism	as	an	exploitative	system.	The	 implementation	of	
the	 UBI	 appears	progressive	for	 it	 frees	 us	 from	 this	 exploitation.	 It	makes	 everyone	 semi-
autonomous	 from	 work.	 But	 this	 is	 a	 very	 narrow	 understanding	 of	 capitalism	 that	 sees	 it	











Such	 visions	 are	 based	 on	 a	 fundamental	 misconception	 of	 the	 nature	 and	 determination	 of	 the	
‘wage’.	The	basic	income,	Mason	contends,	pays	people	‘just	to	exist’.	But	this	is	‘only	a	transitional	
measure	 for	 the	 first	 stage	 of	 the	 postcapitalist	 project’.	 The	 'socialisation'	 of	 the	 wage	 through	
‘collectively	 provided	 services’,	or	 its	 abolition,	follow	 (2015,	 p.	 284-6).	 Payment	 to	 exist,	 coupled	
with	automation,	 allows	networked,	 autonomous	 experimentation	 in	 place	 of	 labour.		As	 such,	
Mason	suggests	that	the	basic	income	would	be	a	transitional	step	towards	the	abolition	of	the	wage.	
But	 even	 this	may	 retain	the	 separation	 of	 people	 from	 independent,	 non-commodified	means	 of	
living	(see	 Bonefeld	 2014).	 The	 social	 conditions	 undergirding	 the	 wage	 would	 continue,	 with	 or	
without	 the	wage	 itself.	 The	 social	 conditions	 for	 the	 sale	 of	 labour-power	would	 remain,	with	 or	
without	a	buyer.	This	is	because	the	wage	is	not	a	reward	for	expended	labour	but	a	payment	to	keep	
workers	 in	 the	 condition	that	 they	 can	 and	must	 labour	 (Critisticuffs	 2015).	 In	 this	way,	 the	wage	
subordinates	human	life	to	the	command	of	money.	We	acquire	what	we	need	only	as	commodities	
bearing	a	price.	Money	 is	value-in-motion.	 In	spite	of	 its	 insubstantiality,	 it	dominates	and	expands	
across	the	whole	social	and	existential	condition	(Lilley	and	Papadopoulos,	2014).		With	the	UBI,	the	
state	 directly	 superintends	 the	 rule	 of	 money.	 So	 while	 UBI	 may	 apparently	 free	 us	 from	
(un)employment,	it	makes	us	more	dependent	on	money	and,	more	dangerously	the	state.	These	are	
forms	of	capitalist	 social	 relations,	not	neutral	entities	 to	be	appropriated	at	will.	Their	persistence	






This	 brings	 us	 to	 the	 problematic	 treatment	 of	 the	 state	 amongst	 advocates	 of	 the	 PWP.	 An	
automated	economy	requires	a	capitalist	state	supporting	and	maintaining	our	capacity	to	consume.	
And	UBI	 increases	 the	dependence	of	people	on	 the	 state	 for	 their	 subsistence.	We	 think	 that	 the	
PWP	has	not	reflected	on	the	nature	of	the	capitalist	state.	It	misconceives	it	as	an	arena	for	power	
struggles	 over	 resources.	 This	 managerial	 view	 of	 the	 state	 focuses	 on	 income	 distribution.	 The	
distribution	 of	 money	 by	 the	 state	 will	 only	 mean	 a	 different	 form	 of	wealth	 sharing	 for	 social	
reproduction.	The	PWP	misses	the	character	of	the	state,	like	money,	as	a	form	assumed	by	capitalist	
social	 relations.	 It	purports	 to	free	people	 from	 the	 burden	 of	 work	 sponsored	 by	 a	 better	
distribution	of	financial	resources	as	a	means	by	which	‘post’-capitalism	society	can	be	accessed.	But	




if	 we	 consider	 the	 state	 politics	 inherent	 in	 current	 proposals	 for	 the	 UBI.	 Consensus	 is	 forming	
around	UBI	from	all	sides	of	the	political	spectrum.	Its	implementation	seems	increasingly	necessary	
to	 combat	a	generalised	 ‘crisis	of	 social	 reproduction’	 sparked	by	endemic	unemployment	and	 the	
retreat	of	the	welfare	state	(Caffentzis	2002;	Bakker	&	Gill	2003;	Leonard	&	Fraser	2016;	Gill	2016).	
But	its	merits	are	contested	(Dinerstein,	Pitts	&	Taylor	2016;	Pitts	&	Dinerstein	2017;	Pitts	2016;	Pitts,	
Lombardozzi	 and	 Warner	 2017a,	 2017b).	 The	 continuity	 it	 guarantees	 against	 the	 underlying	
constraints	 on	 living	 and	 working	 today	 appeals	 as	 much	 to	 those	 who	 wish	 to	 see	 the	 system	
preserved	as	does	 it	 to	 those	 seeking	 to	do	away	with	 it.	 It	 is	 increasingly	 recognized	even	by	 the	
free-market	right	that	a	UBI	may	be	necessary	to	contain	the	contradictions	of	a	society	where	work	
is	 performed	 by	 robots	 and	workers	 are	 surplus	 to	 requirements.	 From	the	Financial	 Times	to	 the	
foothills	of	Davos	it	recommends	itself	as	a	safety	cord	for	capitalism	(Wolf,	2014,	Yamamori	2016).		
Emboldened	 by	 the	 double-edged	 feasibility	 granted	 by	 mainstream	 liberal	 opinion,	 UBI	 is	 now	
the	big	 demand	 of	 a	 contemporary	 left	 inspired	 by	 postcapitalist	 vistas	 (Mason	 2015,	 Srnicek	 and	
Williams	2015)	moving	in	an	increasingly	populist	and	statist	direction	(Pitts	2017a).	In	the	UK,	Labour	
Party	 Shadow	Chancellor	 John	McDonnell	 recently	 announced	a	UBI	working	 group,	 headed	up	by	






Against	 leftist	 aims,	one	possible	destination	of	 the	UBI	 is	 in	 the	policy	agendas	of	 the	 constituent	
parties	of	 the	contemporary	 ‘nationalist	 international’	of	authoritarian	populists	 (Ash	2016,	Mishra	
2016).	 Despite	 analyses	 emphasising	 their	 appeal	 to	 localised	 grievances,	 transnational	
commonalities	 include	 ascendant	 strongman	 leadership,	 pro-Putinism,	 isolationism,	 anti-
cosmopolitanism	 and	 persecution	 of	 ethnic	 and	 religious	 groups.	 Common	 intellectual	 networks,	
international	 alliances,	 funding	 streams,	 news	 sites	 and	 hacking	 networks	 constitute	 a	 material	
infrastructure.	 And	 the	 UBI	 is	 increasingly	 on	 their	 agenda.	 It	 has	 already	 been	 adopted	 by	 the	








The	 Indian	 UBI	 proposals	 follow	 hot	 on	 the	 heels	 of	 the	 so-called	 ‘note	 ban’,	 or	 ‘demonetization’	
whereby,	on	November	8th,	 the	day	of	Donald	Trump’s	election,	 the	 Indian	government	 imposed	a	




UK.	 But	 there	 are	 still	 implications	 for	 how	we	 understand	 the	 UBI	 in	 an	 age	 of	 authoritarianism	
ascendant.	
	
Following	a	pilot	 run	 in	 India	by	 the	Guy	 Standing	 (Davala	et	al	 2015),	 the	 idea	was	 floated	 in	 the	
annual	 economic	 survey	 accompanying	 the	 government’s	 budget	 declaration.	 Although	 small-	 no	
more	 than	 the	 average	 month’s	 wage	 over	 the	 whole	 year-	 it	 would	 make	 a	 substantial	 impact,	
reducing	 absolute	 poverty	 some	 20	 per	 cent.	 It	 would	 be	 partly	 funded	 by	 a	 bonfire	 of	 existing	






Adopting	 the	 ‘authoritarian	 playbook’	 from	 which	 the	 nationalist	 International	 draws,	 Modi	 set	 a	
strongman,	strong-arm	prototype	for	President	Trump	(Robinson	2016).	Indeed,	commentators	draw	
parallels	between	Modi’s	 ‘note	ban’	and	Trump’s	 ‘Muslim	ban’	 (Chakraborty	2017)	The	former	was	
an	exclusionary	measure	not	so	much	targeted	at	but	specifically	impacting	upon	Dalits,	Muslims	and	








forcefully	 upon	 poor	 farmers	 who	 relied	 on	 savings	 to	 subsist,	 by	 rendering	 those	 savings	 both	
useless	and	worthless.	In	this	way,	it	replaced	an	individualised	currency	with	a	digital	state-directed	











not	 conform.	 UBI	 in	 One	 Country	has	 the	 potential	 to	 be	 not	revolutionary,	 as	 the	 left	 imagine,	
but	deeply	reactionary.	With	the	best	of	intentions	in	a	world	gone	bad,	leftish	conceptualisations	of	
the	UBI	 sometimes	 give	 succour	 to	 its	 possible	 implementation	 in	 the	 arsenal	 of	 authoritarianism,	






and	Negri	 (2001,	 p.	 403)	 for	 instance,	write	 that	 a	UBI	 could	 be	 paid	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 ‘citizenship’,	
through	one’s	being	a	‘member	of	society’.	This	is	as	much	out	of	necessity	as	choice,	unless	the	UBI	
is	 organised	 worldwide,	 or	 Europe-wide,	 for	 instance.	 Yet	 the	 idea	 cannot	 be	 extricated	 from	 its	
context	in	concrete	national	conditions.	In	a	time	of	national	retrenchment,	the	UBI	cannot	but	imply	
an	 exclusionary	 approach,	 its	 ‘universality’	 recoded	 as	 the	 universality	 of	 a	 national	 people.	 The	
argument	for	the	universality	of	the	UBI	masks,	as	Bonefeld	suggests		
	
‘the	 global	 character	 of	 exploitative	 relations…The	 specific	 character	 of	 the	 state's	 integration	




The	UBI	 sums	 this	 up:	 contrary	 to	 its	 universality,	 an	exclusionary	measure	which	 grants	 citizens	 a	
guaranteed	income	but	not	necessarily	those	who	are	not	subjects	of	a	given	state.	In	this	way,	the	
UBI	resonates	with	a	politics	reconstituting	itself	around	open	and	closed	as	much	as	left	and	right,	as	
the	 latter	 undergo	 a	 convergence	 (The	 Economist	 2016).	 Rolled	 out	worldwide,	 this	 protectionism	
could	well	aid	and	abet	the	development	of	the	UBI.	The	prospect	of	the	widespread	return	of	capital	






a	 wider	 politics	 that	 the	 left	 must	 do	 its	 best	 to	 resist.	 The	 left	 advocates	 UBI	 out	 of	 the	 best	
intentions,	but	remains	within	a	spellbound	mode	of	thinking	that,	by	not	understanding	capitalism,	
does	not	understand	how	it	is	confronted	(Bonefeld	2016).	Most	painfully,	it	has	the	potential	to	fulfil	
the	programme	of	 right	populisms	and	 totalitarianisms	 through	 time	by	 liquidating	class	 conflict	 in	
production.	 As	 British	 Labour	 MP	 Jon	 Cruddas	 notes,	 in	 this	 way	 the	 UBI	 potentiates	 the	 self-
destruction	of	the	left	and	of	the	labour	movement	(BBC	2016,	see	also	Cruddas	&	Kibasi	2016,	Sodha	
2017).	 Crucially	 the	 UBI	 retains	 the	 current	 rule	 of	 property,	 of	 power,	 whereas,	 as	 Sonia	 Sodha	







which	 people	 access	 the	 things	 they	 need	 by	 means	 of	 the	 wage	 with	 one	 granted	 at	 state	
convenience.	 On	 the	 other,	 for	 those	 not	 currently	 in	 receipt	 of	 a	 wage,	 it	 creates	 a	 permanent	
dependence	on	the	umbilical	cord	of	the	state.	This	last	would	be	no	bad	thing	were	it	not	for	who	
controls	 it.	 And	 it	 limits	 the	 bases	 for	 class	 mobilisation.	 Although	 there	 are	 specificities	 to	 the	
situation	 in	 India	 that	change	some	of	 these	calculations,	applied	more	widely	 the	UBI	breaks	here	
with	 some	 vital	 preconditions	 of	 class	 struggle.	 Under	 the	 real	 illusion	 of	 legal	 equivalence	
circumscribed	by	 the	 impersonal	power	of	 the	state,	buyer	and	seller	of	 labour	power	meet	 in	 the	
market	 as	 equal	 parties.	 The	 class	 struggle	 then	 moves	 through,	 and	 is	 contained	 within,	 the	
practices	and	processes	assumed	by	these	legal	real	appearances.	Class	struggle	is	a	struggle	over	the	
form	of	these	legal	as	well	as	economic	and	political	forms	that	mediate	class	struggle,	which	are,	in	
turn,	 modified,	 or	 even	 destroyed,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Modi	 in	 India	 or	 Trump	 in	 the	 USA.	 	 Wage	
bargaining	sees	struggles	ensue	for	a	higher	price	of	labour	power,	engaged	in	by	associations	of	its	
sellers.	 This	 is	driven	by	 the	 collective	 struggle	 to	 live	and	enjoy	 life.	Once	 the	provision	of	money	
comes	not	 from	the	wage	but	 from	the	state,	 this	web	of	 relations	by	which	workers	win	a	better	
balance	between	 their	 subsistence	and	 the	work	 they	do	collapses.	From	the	 impersonal	power	of	
liberal	legal	structures,	we	have	the	personalised	power	of	state	fiat	determining	who	gets	what.	The	
weighty	democratic,	administrative	and	brute-force	heft	that	this	arrangement	implies	will	no	longer	









may	be	 the	 last	 thing	UBI	 leads	 to.	These	 tendencies	are	always	 there	within	conceptualisations	of	
the	UBI,	right	and	left.	
	
Liquidating	 class	 struggles	 for	 a	nationally-constituted	 citizenry,	 abstract	utopias	 reliant	on	 the	UBI	
treat	 the	 class	 struggle	 as	 a	 closed	 case	 but	 largely	 retain	 the	 current	 rule	 of	 property	 ownership,	
including,	 crucially,	 that	of	 the	means	of	production,	 for	which	no	postcapitalist	or	post-work	vista	
gives	a	convincing	vision	for	redress.	The	basic	income,	as	a	key	principle	of	the	proposed	post-work	
society,	 breaks	 here	 with	 some	 vital	 preconditions	 of	 worker	 organisation.	 Under	 the	 formal	
appearance	 of	 legal	 equivalence	 circumscribed	 by	 the	 impersonal	 power	 of	 the	 state,	 buyer	 and	
seller	of	 labour	power	meet	 in	the	market	as	equal	parties.	The	class	struggle	then	moves	through,	
and	 is	 contained	 within,	 the	 practices	 and	 processes	 assumed	 by	 these	 legal	 appearances.	 Wage	
bargaining	sees	struggles	ensue	for	a	higher	price	of	labour	power,	engaged	in	by	associations	of	its	
sellers.	 This	 is	driven	by	 the	 collective	 struggle	 to	 live	and	enjoy	 life-	more	money,	more	 freedom,	
more	time.	Once	the	provision	of	money	comes	not	from	the	wage	but	from	the	beneficence	of	the	
state,	this	web	of	relations	by	which	workers	win	a	better	balance	between	their	subsistence	and	the	
work	 they	 do	 collapses.	 From	 the	 impersonal	 power	 of	 liberal	 legal	 structures,	 we	 have	 the	
personalised	power	of	state	fiat	determining	who	gets	what.	The	weighty	democratic,	administrative	
and	brute-force	heft	 that	 this	 arrangement	 implies	will	 no	 longer	be	 concealed	behind	 contractual	









domination’	 (Holloway	 1996:	 8)	 for	 	 the	 Keynesian	 state	 contained	 the	 power	 of	 labour	 via	 the	
‘monetization’	 of	 class	 conflict:	 ‘In	 the	 face	 of	 rigidity	 and	 revolt,	 money	 was	 the	 great	 lubricant.	
Wage-bargaining	 became	 the	 focus	 of	 both	 managerial	 change	 and	 worker	 discontent’	 (Holloway	
1996:	23).	The	crisis	of	Keynesianism	was,	in	this	sense,	‘a	crisis	of	a	form	of	containment	of	labour’	
(Holloway,	 1996:	 27).	 The	 basic	 income	 could	 become,	 then,	 another	 form	 of	 domination	 of	 the	
power	of	labour,	only	that	this	time,	rather	than	relying	on	class	conflict,	aims	at	obliterating	it.	
	
The	basic	 income	effectively	abolishes	any	means	by	which	workers	 can	 struggle	 for	a	better	deal,	
liquidating	 class	 struggle	 and	 purporting	 to	 resolve	 its	 contradictions	 at	 the	 imaginary	 level	 of	 a	
nation	state	paying	free	money	to	a	nationally-defined	people.	In	so	doing,	the	vista	of	an	abolition	of	
work	 afforded	 by	 the	 basic	 income	 serves	 up	 the	 fruits	 of	 struggle	 prematurely,	without	 struggles	
having	 taken	place.	 It	 temporarily	defers	 the	contradictions	of	 class	antagonism	without	 resolution	
through	the	antagonism	itself.	This	 is	 ironic	even	on	the	terms	of	the	postcapitalist	argument	itself,	
insofar	as	class	struggle	would	be	necessary	to	drive	up	wages	to	the	extent	that	employers	would	be	
motivated	 to	worth	 low-paid	workers	 in	bad	 jobs	with	machines	 in	 the	 first	place.	Yet	none	of	 the	
popular	imaginaries	of	an	automated	future	entertain	this	notion,	outsourcing	capitalist	development	
to	 technology	 as	 a	 neutral	 force	 as	 opposed	 to	 one	 imbricated	 and	 resulting	 from	 wider	 social	
relations.	
	
By	 endowing	 the	 relationship	 between	 work	 and	 technology	 with	 a	 set	 of	 eschatological	 and	
Promethean	 associations,	 the	 postwork	 hypothesis	 steals	 work	 from	 its	 antagonistic	 context	 in	
capitalist	 social	 relations	 that	both	pre-exist	and	continue	 to	underpin	 the	compulsion	 to	 labour	 in	
the	first	place,	through	money.	This	is	nowhere	more	transparent	in	the	appeal	to	a	benevolent	state	
as	 the	 effective	 payer	 of	 the	wage	qua	 basic	 income.	 This	 purports	 to	 change	 the	 social	 relations	
under	which	we	get	paid	for	the	better,	but	runs	the	risk	of	doing	so	for	the	worst	precisely	because	











want	 better	 pay	 for	 the	 non-bullshit	work	 you	 share	 in	 common?	Addressing	 these	 demands	 to	 a	





pre-empting	 the	overhaul	of	 the	wider	 social	 relations	and	 social	 forms	of	 capitalist	 society.	 These	
forms	 cannot	 be	 escaped	 through	 labour	 alone.	 The	 objectifications	 to	which	 humans	 are	 subject	
have	a	habit	of	coming	back	to	haunt	us,	and	our	attempt	at	freeing	ourselves	from	them	create	new	
objectifications	 that	 control	 us	 anew.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 the	 postcapitalist	 school	 should	 stop	







undergoing	a	 severe	 and	 protracted	 crisis	 of	 social	 reproduction.	 Employment	 increasingly	 fails	 to	
support	 subsistence.	 But	 PWP	 advocates	 confuse	 this	 situation	 with	 an	 unfolding	 end	 of	 work.	 A	
social	reproduction	standpoint	redresses	this.	The	PWP,	by	seeing	in	the	crisis	of	social	reproduction	
the	end	 of	 work,	 misses	 the	 connection	 between	production	 and	 what	 precedes	 it,	 logically	 and	
historically.	As	Nancy	Fraser	(2014,	p.	57)	writes,	while	Marx	‘looked	behind	the	sphere	of	exchange,	
into	the	‘hidden	abode’	of	production,	in	order	to	discover	capitalism’s	secrets’,	it	is	also	necessary	to	
‘seek	production’s	 conditions	of	possibility	behind	 that	 sphere’.	Namely:	why	do	we	have	 to	work,	
and	what	 keeps	 us	working?	 The	 fashionable	 postcapitalists	 want	 to	 do	 away	with	work,	 without	
posing	the	question	why	it	exists	in	the	form	it	does.		
In	 asking	 this,	 the	 social	 reproduction	 perspective	takes	 inspiration	 from	Marxist-feminist	 inquiries	
into	 the	 ‘conditions	 of	 possibility	 of	 labour-power'	and	the	 ‘manner	 in	 which	 labour	 power	 is	
biologically,	socially	and	generationally	reproduced’	(Ferguson	and	McNally,	2015).		Marx	writes	that	
‘the	 worker	 belongs	 to	 capital	 before	 he	 has	 sold	 himself	 to	 the	 capitalist’	 (1976,	 p.	 723).	 This	
relationship	 begins	 ‘not	with	 the	 offer	 of	work,	 but	with	 the	 imperative	 to	 earn	 a	 living’	 (Denning	





is	 workers'	 separation	'from	 the	 means	 of	 their	 subsistence	 (or	 social	 reproduction)’.	 Workplace	
exploitation,	 then,	 as	 Bhattacharya	 (2015)	 asserts,	 is	 not	 the	 singular	moment	 of	 domination.	The	
violent	 denial	 of	 the	 human	 need	 to	 subsist	here	 precedes	 the	 compulsion	 to	 labour.	 There	 is	 no	
escaping	 work	 without	 addressing	 how	 to	 meet	 the	 former.	 The	 PWP	 offers	 no	 alternative	
infrastructure	to	do	so	independent	of	commodification.	The	UBI,	a	possible	solution,	only	reinforces	
the	 rule	 of	money	with	 which	 the	 wage	 is	 intimately	 connected,	 simply	 substituting	 the	 buyer	 of	
labour	power	with	the	state.	 	
What	 the	 social	 reproduction	approach	 suggests,	by	 foregrounding	 the	 constitutive	 social	 relations	
that	undergird	work	to	begin	with,	is	that	struggles	for	social	reproduction	as	also	instances	of	class	
struggle.	Struggle	addressed	to	state	solutions	and	state	recognition	are	themselves	struggles	for	the	
means	to	 live	and	subsist.	As	Anna	Curcio	points	out	 in	an	 interview	with	Kathi	Weeks	 (Weeks	and	






to	 subsist	 and	 reproduce	 the	 means	 of	 both	 living	 and	 labouring.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 a	 political	 choice	 to	
identify	which	kind	of	society	we	want	to	emerge	from	this	crisis.	And,	at	present,	all	the	visions	for	
how	 this	 pans	 out	 are	 implicated	 within	 the	 eventual	 implementation	 of	 the	 basic	 income,	 and	




abstract	 utopian	 schemes	 around	 monetary	 payments	 based	 on	 the	 membership	 of	 this	 elusive	
figure,	 class	nowhere	 to	be	 seen.	But,	 if	 anything,	 the	 space	 to	 create	concrete	utopias	 is	 required	
(Dinerstein	2014;	2016).	A	necessary	first	step	is	to	address	class,	property	and	social	reproduction	in	




in	 spite	 of	 the	 present	 state	 of	 things.	 It	 is	 imperative	 to	 locate	 where	 this	 potential	 lies.	Where	
concrete	 utopias	 are	 called	 for	 in	 practice,	 today	 the	 anti-austerity	 left	 and	 critics	 of	 capitalism	
embrace	 abstract	 utopias	 like	 the	 automated	 worklessness	 of	 advanced	 robotics	 and	 the	 UBI	
(Dinerstein,	Pitts	&	Taylor	2016).		
In	 this	 section	we	will	 look	 at	 the	 example	of	 the	Argentinian	Unemployed	Workers	Organisations	
(UWOs)	as	an	illustration	of	how	each	of	the	impasses	outlined	above	can	be	overcome	and	concrete	
rather	 than	 abstract	 utopias	 envisioned.	 In	 this	 example	 discussed	 by	 one	 of	 us	 elsewhere,	 	 the	
concern	with	the	productive	sphere	is	overcome	with	reference	to	new	forms	of	social	reproduction,	




work	 prospectus.	 Instead	of	 talking	 about	 the	 risk	 of	 co-optation,	we	prefer	 to	 explore	 how	 these	
concrete	utopias	are	translated	by	the	state,	the	law	and	into	policy.	This	means	that	while	they	are	
at	 risk	 of	 being	 integrated	 into	 the	modus	 operandi	 and	 logics	 imposed	 by	 the	 powers	 that	 they	
confront,	and	 therefore	suffer	de-radicalisation,	 this	 translation	 is	a	process	of	 struggle	 that	allows	
room	for	radical	change	and	excess.	
UWOs	are	one	of	a	number	of	Latin	American	social	movements	that	seek	autonomy	and	dignity	in	
escaping	 social	 exclusion	 and	 unemployment.	 The	work	 of	 one	 of	 the	 present	 authors	 (Dinerstein	
2010,	 2013,	 2014,	 2017)	 has	 been	 central	 in	 charting	 the	 story	 of	 how	 the	 UWOs	 came	 to	 pass.	
Unemployment	in	Argentina	had	risen	from	6%	in	1991	to	18%	in	1995.	‘Organisationally	incoherent’	
roadblock	 protests	 called	 for	 ‘job	 creation,	 public	workers,	 essential	 services	 [and]	 participation	 in	
the	management	of	 employment	programmes’	 (Dinerstein	2010,	 p.	 358).	 These	 ‘Piqueteros’	 had	a	
strategy	of	 ‘leveraging	 state	 resources	 through	a	 combination	of	 protest	 and	 social	 projects	 in	 the	
community	 and	 not	 only	 challenged	 the	 common	 view	 of	 the	 unemployed	 as	 excluded	 and	
redundant	 but	 also	 influenced	 the	 institutional	 framework	 within	 which	 social	 demands	 could	 be	
made’.	They	did	so	through	the	creation	of		new	UWOs	which,	through	resistance	and	struggles,	were	
successful	 in	 drawing	 down	 state	 benefits	 that	 would	 have	 been	 paid	 individually	 and	 paid	 them	
collectively	 for	 community	 projects	 that	 were	 decided	 collectively	 to	 address	 the	 needs	 of	 social	
reproduction.		
One	 in	 particular	 is	 worthy	 of	 specific	 scrutiny:	 the	 Union	 Trabajadores	 Desocupados	 (UTD),	 or	
Unemployed	Workers	Union.	The	UTD	was	 formed	 following	 the	privatization	of	 the	 local	 state	oil	
company-	only	5600	of	51000	workers	remained.	 In	 the	municipality	of	General	Mosconi,	34.6%	of	
the	population	was	unemployed	by	2001.	The	UTD	was	led	by	ex-oil	workers,	who	assessed	projects	
for	support	according	to	 ‘local	need’,	 ‘dignity’	and	 ‘genuine	work’	 in	 ‘solidarity’.	Projects	addressed	
‘long-term	 sustainability’	 in	 ‘housing,	 education	 and	 environmental	 protection’,	 and	 also	 everyday	
issues	 like	 ‘recycling,	 refurbishing	 public	 buildings	 and	 houses,	 community	 farms,	 soup	
kitchen…retirement	 homes,	 health	 care	 visits	 to	 the	 ill	 and	 disabled,	 production	 of	 regional	 crafts,	
carpentry…maintaining	and	 repairing	hospital	emergency	 rooms	and	schools.’	 In	 this	way,	 the	UTD	
became	the	‘quasi-city	council’	of	General	Mosconi.	
They	did	this	through	state	funding,	but	not	in	a	direct	way	reliant	on	the	benevolence	of	the	state.	
Rather	 resources	were	captured	 in	an	active	and	open	relationship	of	conflict	and	negotiation	 that	
created	space	 for	 things	 to	exceed	the	capacity	of	 the	state	 to	control	and	govern	how	the	money	
was	spent.	The	UWOs	fought	for	‘the	re-appropriation	of	social	programmes	for	collective	purposes’,	
and	 they	 did	 this	 by	 switching	 between	 two	 modes	 of	 activity:	 mobilisation,	 which	 used	 the	
roadblocks	 to	 demand	 resources;	 and	 policy,	 which	 moved	 state	 resources	 through	 the	
neighbourhood	to	implement	the	resources	in	social	projects.	It	is	only	by	means	of	and	through	the	
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seeming	 contradiction	 between	 these	 two	 registers	 of	 mobilisation	 and	 social	 policy	 that	 state	
resources	 can	 be	 leveraged	 at	 all.	 The	 UWOs	 worked	 within	 contradiction	 rather	 than	 seeking	 to	
escape	in	a	final,	closed	settlement	that	established	an	abstract	utopia.	Their	concrete	utopia,	insofar	
as	it	was	achieved	at	all,	was	subject	to	and	thrived	from	these	contradictions,	‘using	resistance	as	a	
conduit	 for	 community	 development	 and	 community	 development	 as	 a	 conduit	 for	 resistance’	
(Dinerstein	 2010,	 p.	 361).	 The	 post-work	 prospectuses	 based	 on	 the	 basic	 income,	 by	 seeking	 the	
absolution	 from	 work	 by	 means	 of	 the	 state,	 foreclose	 contradiction	 in	 a	 final	 abstract	 utopia	 of	
automated	 worklessness	 with	 no	 room	 for	 further	 struggle	 within	 the	 interstices	 of	 those	
contradictions.	
Rather	 than	 a	welfare	 policy	 granted	 from	up	on	 high	 to	which	 individual	 recipients	must	 address	
themselves,	 the	UWOs	 instituted	what	Dinerstein	 (2010)	 describes	 as	 ‘welfare	 policy	 from	below’.	
Benefits	of	£30	per	head	per	month	were	paid	every	6	months	from	the	state,	and	then	distributed	
by	the	UTD	among	the	‘unemployed	workers’	who	were	‘willing	to	undertake	community	work’.	By	
2005	 the	 UTD	 managed	 as	 many	 programmes	 as	 the	 municipality	 and	 more	 than	 the	 provincial	
governments-	housing	co-ops,	garment	factory,	training	centres,	a	university.	It	also	served	as	a	job	
agency	 and	 trade	 union,	 using	 its	 leverage	 to	 get	 unemployed	workers	 jobs,	 backed	up	 by	 ‘access	
blockades’	outside	and,	once	enough	UTDs	employed,	 ‘line	stoppages’	within	 (Dinerstein	2010,	pp.	
360-1).	
As	 such	welfare	was	 locked	 into	a	 convincing	 reconstitution	of	 a	 community	of	work	and	workers.	
UTD,	for	example,	identified	‘work	as	a	true	human	attribute	that	must	be	used	for	the	production	of	
useful	goods	and	services’	(Dinerstein	2010,	p.	361).		The	key	issue	here	was	‘dignity’.	Their	search	for	
dignified	 work	 permitted	 neither	 Prometheanism	 nor	 neurosis	 around	 what	 is	 conceptualised	
correctly	as	an	everyday	point	of	meaning	and	antagonism.	By	working	within	the	contradictions	that	
confront	the	everyday	practice	of	work	and	the	abstract	determination	of	labour	in	capitalist	society,	
the	 UWOs	 ‘challenged	 the	 individualistic	 logic	 of	 workfare	 and	 state	 policy	 and	 reconceptualised	
‘work’	 in	 capitalist	 society’	 (2017)	 in	 a	 far	 more	 concrete	 and	 practical	 way	 than	 the	 postwork	
prospectus	 seems	 capable	 of,	 whilst	 also	 embedding	 this	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 overhaul	 the	 socially	
reproductive	social	relations	of	subsistence	that	compel	us	to	work	in	the	first	place.	For	Zechner	and	
Hansen	(2015),	‘struggles	around	social	reproduction	allow	for	a	renegotiation	of	the	around	what	is	
considered	 work,	 or	 what	 is	 valued	 as	 such’.	 We	 can	 see	 in	 the	 piqueteros’	 struggle	 over	 social	
reproduction	a	similar	renegotiation,	situating	the	separation	from	the	means	of	subsistence	and	the	







state	 programmes	 on	 which	 their	 claims	 are	 made.	 UWOs	 had	 to	 become	 NGOs,	 registered	 and	
assessed	by	the	state,	or	else,	as	did	the	UTD,	retain	autonomy	by	using	the	registration	of	a	friendly	
NGO,	so	as	to	‘access	funding	[whilst]	continuing	to	design	its	own	strategies	and	implement	its	own	
community	 ventures’	 (Dinerstein	 2010,	 p.	 360).	 But	 it	 was	 working	 within	 this	 antagonistic	 and	
contradictory	 relationship	with	 the	 state	 that	 allowed	 their	 social	 gains	 to	 be	 achieved.	 The	 basic	
income,	on	the	other	hand,	concentrates	power	absolutely	in	the	hands	of	the	state	as	a	benefactor	
rather	 than	 a	 boss,	with	 the	more	 subservient	 and	 compliant	 relationship	 this	 implies.	 The	UWOs	
permit	 acceptance	 that	 the	 embeddedness	 of	 social	 actors	 ‘in,	 against	 and	 beyond’	 the	 state	 will	
always	 be	 contested,	 and	 it	 is	 this	 from	 which	 we	 proceed	 as	 a	 starting	 point,	 rather	 than	

















the	 last	 of	 these,	 wherein	 lies	 an	 untranslatable	 excess-	 ‘the	 impossibility	 to	 completely	 translate	
movement-led	SSE	practice	into	policy’	(2017).		
Dinerstein	 concludes	 that	 ‘[t]he	 collective	 use	 of	 individual	 social/unemployment	 benefits	 for	









crisscrossed	 by	 contradiction.	 Contradictorily,	 the	 reproduction	 of	 each-	 life	 and	 capital-	 is	 the	
reproduction	of	the	other.	Capitalist	society	depends	upon	the	commodification	of	the	labour-power	
we	 sell	 to	 live.	As	 Ferguson	 and	 McNally	 note	 (2015),	 the	 reproduction	 of	 labour-power	 is	
simultaneously	 ‘our	quest	 to	 satisfy	human	needs,	 to	live’.	What	 this	dualness	 indicates	 is	 that	 ‘the	
very	 acts	 where	 the	working	 class	 strives	 to	 attend	 to	 its	 own	 needs	 can	 be	 the	 ground	 for	 class	
struggle’	 (Bhattacharya	 2015).	 Social	 reproduction	 is	 a	 sphere	 of	 conflict	 as	 long	 as	 labour	 power	
implies	this	twin	intent.	The	capitalist	desires	its	reproduction	to	exploit,	the	worker	its	reproduction	
to	eat.	Wage	demands,	 strikes	 for	pay	or	better	hours,	 exercise	 regimes,	diets.	 In	 seeking	a	better	
standard	of	life,	all	express	this	antagonistic	settlement's	contradictory	contours.	
The	struggles	highlight	how	social	 reproduction	 is	crisscrossed	by	contradictions,	wherein	 lies	room	
for	 resistance	 and	 rupture,	 and	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 ‘alternative	 forms	 of	 social	 reproduction’,	 or	





to,	but	also	a	drag	on,	 accumulation’.	Its	needs	are	not	always	 those	 capital	permits-	 and	 they	are	
satisfied	only	in	a	false,	unfulfilled	way.		
In	 rearguard	 actions	 to	 protect	 the	 welfare	 system,	 for	 instance,	 the	 contradictory	 unity	 of	 the	
situation	is	clear.	Capitalism	is	undergoing	a	generalised	crisis	of	social	reproduction	that	has	reached	
the	global	north	since	2008,	but	which	 is	far	from	new	in	the	global	South.	Cutbacks	 in	the	welfare	
state	 couple	 with	 the	 delinking	 of	 subsistence	 from	 the	 wage,	 endemic	 unemployment	 and	 the	
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physical	 and	 social	 exhaustion	 of	 the	 commodification	 of	 labour-power.	 In	unemployment	 and	
extreme	 precarity,	 satisfying	 human	 needs	becomes	 an	 overwhelming	task.	 The	 crisis	worsens	this	
state	of	precarity.	The	welfare	state	withdraws.	This	compels	us	to	answer	questions	about	how	we	
satisfy	 these	 needs.	 As	 Dinerstein	 (2002:	 14)	 puts	 it,	 the	 ‘contradiction	 between	 the	 needs	 of	 the	
workers	and	the	needs	of	capital	that	lives	at	the	core	of	the	problem	of	social	reproduction	cannot	
be	more	 vivid.	 This	 is	 not	 a	 political,	 economic	 or	 social	 issue	 but	 it	 is	 about	 the	 reproduction	 of	
human	‘life’’.	
In	fighting	for	the	welfare	system	we	both	ensure	our	reproduction	as	humans	well	as	workers,	and	
in	 turn	 the	 reproduction	of	 capitalist	 society.	 The	 two	 sides,	 in	 their	 contradictory	 unity,	 are	 the	
same.	Our	survival	hinges	on	the	survival	of	capital,	for	now,	from	which	we	seek	strength	to	fight	on	
for	an	alternative	to	it.	The	social	reproduction	standpoint	suggests	that	capital	and	state	sustain	us.	
But	 it	 endows	 the	 situation	with	a	 thoroughly	 contradictory	 status.	 There	 is	 a	 total	 absence	of	any	




support	 it.	Struggles	over	 social	 reproduction	are	 ‘labour’	 struggles.	Concurrently,	‘labour’	 struggles	
are	mainly	 struggles	over	 social	 reproduction.	We	struggle	 to	 live,	not	 to	work.	This	 takes	place	in,	
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